People across societies engage in costly sharing, but the extent of such sharing shows striking cultural variation, highlighting the importance of local norms in shaping generosity. Despite this acknowledged role for norms, it is unclear when they begin to exert their influence in development. Here we use a Dictator Game to investigate the extent to which 4-to 9-year-old children are sensitive to selfish (give 20%) and generous (give 80%) norms. Additionally, we varied whether children were told how much other children give (descriptive norm) or what they should give according to an adult (injunctive norm). Results showed that children generally gave more when they were exposed to a generous norm. However, patterns of compliance varied with age. Younger children were more likely to comply with the selfish norm, suggesting a licensing effect. By contrast, older children were more influenced by the generous norm, yet capped their donations at 50%, perhaps adhering to a pre-existing norm of equality. Children were not differentially influenced by descriptive or injunctive norms, suggesting a primacy of norm content over norm format. Together, our findings indicate that while generosity is malleable in children, normative information does not completely override pre-existing biases.
Introduction
People everywhere engage in costly prosocial behavior, ranging from every-day acts like volunteering time at community events to more tangible gestures like giving away a proportion of one's earnings to charity. Indeed, according to Giving USA, in the last year people in the USA alone gave an estimated $358.38 billion dollars to charity (more than $1000 per adult) highlighting the economic importance of understanding the mechanisms supporting generosity in humans.
A great deal of work by economists and psychologists has shown that generous behavior can be readily elicited under laboratory conditions. The most widely used task for capturing generosity in the lab is the Dictator Game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986) . In this game, one person-the dictator-is given a sum of money and is asked to allocate the endowment between themselves and a passive recipient. While traditional economic models predict that dictators will keep the entire endowment for themselves because any donation necessarily reduces the dictator's payoff, dictators typically share a portion of their endowment with partners (Engel, 2011) . A further striking finding from work on the Dictator Game is that the amount shared with partners shows dramatic variation across different societies (Henrich et al., 2005) . For instance, in one cross-cultural investigation of Dictator Game giving, Hadza participants offered a 20% share on average, while Tsimane participants typically offered ten percent more (Henrich et al., 2005) . In these two societies, few people kept everything for themselves, in contrast to American participants, many of whom refused to share at all (Camerer, 2003) . This cultural variation demonstrates that while generosity may be a common human behavior, what constitutes generosity is profoundly shaped by local norms.
An influential approach to addressing how norms affect behavior begins by distinguishing between two different types of normative information, what we refer to here as norm format. Descriptive norms describe what others are doing, while injunctive norms describe what ought to be done to earn social approval (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990) . Descriptive and injunctive norms have garnered a great deal of attention in social psychology and each appears to influence people's behavior in a range of social situations including littering (Cialdini et al., 1990) , taking resources from a national park (Cialdini et al., 2006 ) and household energy consumption (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007) . Theoretically, the distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms may be further explored by placing it in a more http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.01.006 0010-0277/Ó 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
